



Constitution-making in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi: 










Ten years after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, Libya still has not adopted a permanent 
constitution. Over the last decade, both national bodies and transnational actors have taken 
part in constitution-making; however, all efforts have been unsuccessful so far. While the 
scholarship on post-2011 Libya has mainly focused on the impact of local events and 
national actors on this process, this essay outlines the recent history of Libya’s constitution-
making by stressing the intermingling of the activities of local bodies and transnational 
actors. By using the theorical lens of transnational legal orders (TLOs), it claims that two 
TLOs – the Western liberal democratic TLO and the Islamic one - will coexist if the 2017 
draft constitution is adopted. Nevertheless, both TLOs would be necessary to reinforce the 
legitimacy of the constitution before, on the one hand, international organisations and 
Western countries and the Libyan population, on the other. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Over the last decade, Libya has been experiencing several efforts to adopt a new 
constitution. These endeavours have largely developed within a transnational 
framework and have gone hand in hand with the attempts to make a compromise 
between several political actors and militias that have emerged from the civil war. 
The necessity to reach this result has been clear also in the words of Mahmoud 
Jibril, the chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC) and de facto head 
of state after the outbreak of the Libyan uprising. He stated that «the moment we 
draft a constitution, then there is a frame of reference»1. However, the path towards 
the development of this frame of reference has been arduous and has not led to any 
permanent constitution yet.  
Therefore, this contribution will outline the recent history of Libya’s 
constitution-making by describing the activities of both national bodies and 
transnational actors after the fall of Gaddafi. Historically, but more clearly over the 
last decades and in conjunction with conflicts, constitution-making has been 
increasingly characterised by the interaction of local parties with transnational 
actors2. This interaction has been particularly clear in the Libyan context.  
However, the scholarship on post-2011 Libya’s constitution-making has so far 
mainly focused on the impact of Libyan actors and local events on this process. 
Johnson wrote about Libya’s «conflict constitution-making», assessing the impact 
of the civil war on constitution-making processes3. Similarly, van Lier concentrated 
on the local level, giving an interesting contribution relating to the activities of the 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) and holding Libya as an example of the 
unlikeliness of solving conflicts through the redistribution of power and resources 
or the adoption of a constitution in a context with a high social conflict and a deeply 
divided political landscape4.  
Additionally, the works of Geha and Volpi, Sawani and Pack, Schnelzer, and 
Baldinetti directed the attention towards the Libyan society. Geha and Volpi 
focused on the constitutional dialogues led by the Forum for Democratic Libya 
between February and March 2013 and argued that the existence of ideational and 
practical continuities with previous political practices impacted on the emergence 
of new forms of effective civic activism. Thus, its integration in debates about the 
constitution resulted in an arduous task5. Sawani and Pack illustrated how different 
 
1 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
Springer, 2016, 55. 
2 Ibidem; J. Yeh, W. Chang, The Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism: Its Features, 
Challenges and Solutions, in Penn State International Law Review, No. 1, 2009, 91. 
3 D.E.W. Johnson, Conflict Constitution-making in Libya and Yemen, in University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law, No. 2, 2017, 298.  
4 F.A. van Lier, Constitution-making as a Tool for State-Building? Insights From an Ethnographic 
Analysis of the Libyan Constitution-Making Process, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 
Working Paper No. 192, 2018, 18. 
5 C. Geha, F. Volpi, Constitutionalism and Political Order in Libya 2011-2014: Three Myths about 
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groups – namely the Islamists, the federalists and Amazigh – contested the Interim 
Constitutional Declaration and how the National Transitional Council answered to 
their demands6. Similarly, Schnelzer’s book focusing on the constitutional 
discourse is an important work to understand the positions of different Libyan 
actors7. Finally, Baldinetti examined the emergence of civil society groups that 
asked for the constitutional recognition of minority rights, as it was the case of the 
ethnic minorities Amazigh, Tebu and Tuareg8.  
This paper aims at contributing to the existing scholarship on Libya’s 
constitution-making by shifting the attention from a local to a transnational level. 
In doing so, I will adopt the theoretical framework of transnational legal orders 
(TLOs) to the study of constitutional norms of Ginsburg, Halliday and Shaffer9. 
Therefore, this essay will stress the relevance of the interplay of Libyan bodies and 
transnational actors – especially the UN, the EU, the Venice Commission and the 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue – in the ongoing constitution-building, and the 
consequent inevitable inclusion of local and transnational norms in the next Libyan 
constitution. As a result, inspired by the insightful studies by Thier on Afghanistan10 
and Morrow on Iraq11, this essay will contribute to the study of the recent 
constitution-making in Muslim-majority countries in transition. This field of 
research is particularly relevant to understand the interaction between two different 
and sometimes contrasting TLOs: the Western liberal democratic TLO and the 
Islamic TLO. This essay will conclude that this interaction will need to be at the 
basis of the next Libyan constitution in order to increase its legitimacy before 
Libyan and international actors.   
 
2. Libyan constitutional history before the Arab Uprisings   
 
Libya has existed as a country since 1929, when the regions of Cyrenaica, Fezzan 
and Tripolitania were united by Italy under one governor. However, after the Italian 
defeat in the Second World War, they were put under the administration of two of 
the winners of the conflict: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica came under the 
administration of Great Britain, while Fezzan was administered by France. It would 
take a few years until Libya was united again: in 1950 the British made Idris al-
 
6 Y. Sawani, J. Pack, Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Qadhafi: the Islamist, 
Regionalist, and Amazigh Challenges, in The Journal of North African Studies, No. 4, 2013. 
7 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
cit. 
8 A. Baldinetti, Identità nazionale e riconoscimento delle minoranze in Libia: le richieste della 
società civile, in E. Diodato, F. Guazzini (a cura di), La guerra alle frontiere d’Europa: incognite e 
prospettive nel Mediterraneo, Carocci, 2014, 113-116. 
9 G. Shaffer, T. Ginsburg, T. Halliday (eds.), Constitution-making and Transnational Legal Order, 
Cambridge University Press, 2019, 6-7. 
10 J.A. Thier, Big Tent, Small Tent. The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, in L. Miller, 
Framing the State in Times of Transition, United States Institute of Peace, 2010. 
11 J. Morrow, Deconstituting Mesopotamia. Cutting a Deal on the Regionalization of Iraq, in L. 
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Senussi, leader of the Senussiyya brotherhood and supporter of Great Britain 
against the Axis, the king of the United Kingdom of Libya12. The following year, a 
constitution, considered one of the most progressive of that time13, was adopted14.  
The role of transnational actors was clear in the drafting process of the first 
Libyan constitution. In 1949, the UN Commissioner Pelt had arrived in the country 
and proved instrumental for the creation of a National Assembly thanks to a series 
of negotiations with the provinces15. At the end, despite the existence of divergent 
views among the three provinces, the National Assembly adopted a constitution in 
October 1951.  
The preamble of the constitution established a union between the people of 
Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan under King Idris al-Senussi. Under Chapter I, 
Libya was a hereditary monarchy and had a representative system of government 
(art. 2) and Islam was the religion of the State (art. 5). Chapter II was devoted to 
the rights of the people, stressing the equality of Libyans without distinction of 
religion, belief, race, language, wealth, kinship or political or social opinions (art. 
11) and enlisting a series of rights and freedoms. Chapter III related to the federal 
government16. It distinguished between powers of the federal government (art. 36), 
joint powers (art. 38) and provincial powers for the subject matters not enlisted in 
the previous articles (art. 39).  
The following chapters were devoted to the division of powers. The executive 
power was exercised by the king (art. 42), the legislative power by the king jointly 
with the parliament (art. 41), the judiciary power by the supreme court and the other 
tribunals (art. 43). The king also had the power to appoint the prime minister and 
the ministers by proposition of the prime minister (art. 78). The council of ministers 
had the responsibility to direct all international and external affairs of the State, 
according to the powers of the federal government established by the constitution 
(art. 84). The ministers were responsible before the Chamber of Representatives 
(art. 87), but not before the Senate, the chamber that represented the three provinces. 
 
12 See A.M. Morone, Idris’ Libya and the Role of Islam: International Confrontation and Social 
Transformation, in Oriente Moderno, No. 97, 2017. 
13 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
cit., 31-32. 
14 See Constitution du Royaume-Uni de Libye, 7 October 1951, 
https://mjp.univperp.fr/constit/ly1951.htm#Chapitre_III. 
15 See F. Cresti, M. Cricco, Storia della Libia contemporanea, Carocci, 2015, 144-146; D. 
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 46; A.M. Morone, 
Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The case of the Bin Sha‘ban Family, in 
A.M. Di Tolla, V. Schiattarella (eds.), Libya between History and Revolution: Resilience, New 
Opportunities and Challenges for the Berbers, UniorPress, 2020, 46. 
16 Federalism reflected the interests of Cyrenaica and Fezzan, which feared a unitary government 
dominated by the more populated region of Tripolitania. Conversely, Tripolitania believed that the 
federal formula would leave the central government with little power. At the end, federalism 
prevailed. D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, cit., 47; A. Bensaâd, Libya: The Dynamics 
of Fragmentation and the Circumvention of the (Re-)Construction of the State, in Afriche e Orienti, 
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Chapter X focused on the dispositions concerning the provinces that should adopt 
their own organic law, provided that it was in accordance with the constitution. 
Finally, Chapters XI and XII stated that the official language was Arabic (art. 186), 
the United Kingdom of Libya had two capitals, Tripoli and Benghazi (art. 188), and 
the constitution could be revised with the exception of the dispositions concerning 
the monarchic regime, the succession to throne, the representative and 
parliamentary form of government and the principles of freedom and equality (art. 
196-197). 
As the federal form of government was not included among these dispositions, 
it was at the core of the Constitutional Amendment of 196317. By the end of the 
1950s the rapid economic growth due to the extraction of oil made it clear that 
federalism was too weak18, as the category of the joint powers enabled the provinces 
to prevent the development of national policies in crucial areas such as taxation and 
economic development19. Consequently, the federal system left the way to a unified 
state. The abolition of the federal formula represented «the single most critical 
political act during the monarchy’s tenure in office»20. Law No.1 of 1963 repealed 
the articles which dealt with the federal system: the government concentrated 
administrative, economic and planning powers at the central level and replaced the 
federal provinces with ten administrative units21. Oil revenues and company and 
individual taxation started being paid directly to the central government22. 
However, at that time, despite the long list of rights of Chapter II of the 
constitution, normally associated with the liberal democratic TLO, Libya was far 
from being a democratic country. Political parties were banned, and the opposition 
suppressed. Politics was regulated by kinship ties, as King Idris relied on 
intermediaries to rule the country. He delegated the authority to power families, so 
that his legitimacy derived from «a network of tribal loyalty and affiliations»23. This 
system increased the wealth of the monarchy thanks to alliances with tribal leaders 
to control trade routes but did not guarantee an equal distribution of the revenues of 
trade and oil to the entire population24. By taking advantage from this situation, the 
military staged a coup on 1st September 1969, marking the end of the constitutional 
monarchy. A twelve-member Revolutionary Command Council was established 
and declared the birth of the Libyan Arab Republic with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi 
 
17 See Libya’s Constitution of 1951 as Amended by Law No. 1 of 1963, https://constitutionnet.org/sit 
es/default/files/1951_-_libyan_constitution_english.pdf. 
18 The Carter Center, The 2014 Constitutional Drafting Assembly Elections in Libya – Final report, 
2014, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_repo 
rts/libya06112014-final-rpt.pdf, 9. 
19 D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, cit., 48. 
20 Idem, 64. 
21 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
cit., 32. 
22 D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, cit., 64. 
23 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
cit., 32. 
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as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and de facto head of state. The 
previous constitution was abolished and substituted by a Constitutional 
Proclamation on 11th December 1969 until a new permanent constitution was 
drafted25. 
Under the 1969 Proclamation, Libya was an Arab, democratic and free republic 
in which sovereignty was vested in the people (art. 1). Islam was the religion of the 
state and Arabic was the official language (art. 2). Social solidarity was described 
as the foundation of national unity, while the family was the foundation of the 
society (art. 3). Some articles were also devoted to work, described as a right, a duty 
and an honour (art. 4), to the equality of all citizens before the law (art. 5) and to 
socialism, meant in its Arabic and Islamic sense, thus protecting private property 
(art. 6-8). Chapter II described the system of government: the Revolutionary 
Command Council constituted the supreme authority, and exercised the powers 
attached to national sovereignty, decided the general policies of the state, 
promulgated laws and decrees and made the necessary decisions to protect the 
revolution and its regime (art. 18-20).  
However, despite the initial aim of the 1969 Constitutional Proclamation to draft 
a new constitution, between 1969 and 2011 there was no clear constitutional 
framework in Libya26. Gaddafi envisaged a unique form of state: a third option 
between the capitalist democracy and the socialist Soviet state. In 1971 he held a 
speech where he stated that the country would move towards popular rule27 but in 
the same year the Arab Socialist Union was created as a vanguard party to mobilize 
the masses and consolidate the revolution. However, since 1972 any political 
activity outside the Arab Socialist Union was prohibited28 and since 1973 any 
reference to traditional democratic structures, such as the parliament and political 
parties, were considered a deceit for the population29.  
Then, in 1977 the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the 
People was adopted30. It was not a constitution per se, and it even did not aim at the 
drafting of a new one: the Quran was the constitution (art. 2). The Declaration was 
composed of only 10 articles that stated that the new official name of Libya was 
“The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya” (art. 1). Formally, the 
jamahiriyya (“republic of the masses”) was a new form of state where the people 
could directly rule through People’s Congresses, People’s Committees and 
Professional Unions (art. 3). At the top of this pyramid, there was the General 
Secretariat headed by Gaddafi.  
 
25 See The Libyan Arab Republic Constitutional Proclamation of 1969, 
https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/libyan-constitution-1969. 
26 International Commission of Jurists, The Draft Libyan Constitution: Procedural Deficiencies, 
Substantive Flaws, 2015, 15. 
27 D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, cit., 81. 
28 Idem, 82. 
29 M. Campanini, Storia del Medio Oriente contemporaneo, Il Mulino, 2017, 147. 
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The ten articles enshrined the ideas that Gaddafi had included in the 1975 Green 
Book, which combined the theories of nationalism, Islam, socialism and 
populism31. Two years later, Gaddafi relinquished all his government positions but, 
practically, the country continued to be ruled by a small military élite headed by 
him, and the 1977 Declaration was supplemented by the Green Book. According to 
it, «the natural law of any society is either tradition (custom) or religion. Any other 
attempt to draft law for any society, outside these two sources, is invalid and 
illogical»32. This provision undermined the existing constitutional framework of 
Libya33, so that the Green Book became the actual constitution: the creation of the 
jamahiriyya made the directives contained in the book the guiding legal norms34. 
However, instead of realising a system of direct democracy, Gaddafi developed a 
totalitarian system based on the mobilization of the masses and controlled all 
aspects of Libyan politics without holding any formal office but with a powerful 
secret service and a system of mutual denunciation35. However, this scheme did not 
manage to ensure its permanent existence. When the Arab Uprisings broke out, 
protests spread also in Libya.  
 
3. The establishment of the National Transitional Council and the adoption of 
the 2011 Interim Constitutional Declaration 
 
After the revolts broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, also the Libyans started 
protesting. The first uprising took place on 15th February 2011 in Benghazi where 
the security forces reacted aggressively36. Then, protests spread throughout the 
eastern region and turned into a mass movement37. On 27th February, the NTC 
established itself as a transitional government38. However, since its origins, it 
experienced problems of reduced trust due to the lack of transparency in deciding 
its membership39  
 
31 F. Cresti, M. Cricco, Storia della Libia contemporanea, Carocci, 2015, 229-231. 
32 M. Al-Qadhafi, Green Book, Ithaca Press, 1999, 16. 
33 The Draft Libyan Constitution: Procedural Deficiencies, Substantive Flaws, cit., 15. 
34 D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, cit., 121. 
35 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
cit., 33. See also L. Anderson, Muammar al-Qaddafi. The ‘King’ of Libya, in Journal of 
International Affairs, No. 2, 2001.  
36 Protests broke out as a reaction to the arrest of Fathi Turbil, defence attorney of the victims of the 
massacre in the prison of Abu Salim. Thanks to the Internet, opposition movements in exile 
organised a “day of rage” with the organisers of the 15th February protest. As a result of the violent 
contraposition between the protesters and the police, there were 15 victims and hundreds of 
casualties. F. Cresti, M. Cricco, Storia della Libia contemporanea, cit., 275. 
37 K. Mezran, The Libyan Conundrum, in A.M. Morone, Libya in Transition: Human Mobility, 
International Conflict and State Building, in Afriche e Orienti, No. 3, 2018, 10. 
38 See S. Henneberg, Managing Transition. The First Post-Uprising Phase in Tunisia and Libya, 
Cambridge University Press, 2020, 102-106. 
39 K. Mezran, The Libyan Conundrum, cit., 10. The NTC was composed of the president and 30 
other members (including five women). However, by 23rd March 2011, only the name of nine of 
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The NTC came to exist in a tense time characterised by a strong international 
attention to Gaddafi’s brutal repression. The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
Resolution 1970 on 26th February 2011 that deplored the gross and systematic 
violations of human rights40. Similarly, on 11th March, an extraordinary European 
Council issued a declaration expressing solidarity to the Libyan people, 
condemning the violent repression, welcoming the UNSC Resolution 1970 and 
stating that «Member States will examine all necessary options, provided that there 
is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region»41. In the 
next days, despite a more reluctant stance, the Arab League (AL) asked the UNSC 
to impose a no-flight zone, the African Union (AU) stressed the legitimacy of the 
Libya’s people’s aspiration to democracy and justice and the Secretary General of 
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference condemned the severe violations of 
human rights and international law in Libya42. Eventually, on 17th March 2011, the 
UNSC passed Resolution 1973 which established a no-flight zone and authorised 
the member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians43. Therefore, 
since mid-March 2011, a multi-state coalition led by NATO intervened in Libya44, 
leaving an indelible mark on the following state-building and constitution-making 
process and changing the balance of power in favour of the opposition.  
In this tense context, on 3rd August 2011, the members of the NTC adopted an 
Interim Constitutional Declaration that provided for a timetable for the formation 
of a new government and the constitution-making process45. Like the constitutions 
of 1951, 1969 and 1971, it established an independent democratic state where the 
people were the source of authority. At the same time, it also reaffirmed – similarly 
to previous Libyan constitutions and to the ones of other Muslim-majority countries 
– that Islam was the religion of the state and the shari‘a the principle source of 
legislation. However, it also guaranteed the freedom of practicing religious rights 
to non-Muslims and the respect of their personal status (art. 1)46. In addition, while 
 
control of pro-Gaddafi forces. Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Studi – Dipartimento Affari Asteri, 
L’opposizione al regime libico, in Documentazione e ricerche, No. 211, 23 March 2011, 
http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/es0728_0.htm. 
40 UNSC, Resolution 1970 (2011), https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1970%20(2011).  
41 General Secretariat of the Council, Extraordinary European Council 11th March 2011. 
Declaration, April 2011, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec 
/119780.pdf.  
42 Sénat, Compte Rendu Intégral, Séance du mardi 22 mars 2011, in Journal Officiel de la 
République Française, 2011, p. 2097. 
43 UNSC, Resolution 1973 (2011). 
44 See R. Erdağ, Libya in the Arab Spring. From Revolution to Insecurity, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 
30. 
45 See Libya’s Constitution of 2011, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_ 
2011.pdf. 
46 These elements show an evolution with respect to the 1977 Declaration and the 1969 
Constitutional Declaration and even with respect to the 1951 Constitution. In fact, the ten articles of 
the 1977 Declaration simply specified that the Quran was the constitution of the state (art. 2) but did 
not devote any article to the protection of religious minorities. Similarly, art. 2 of the 1969 
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recognising Arabic as the official language, it also preserved «the linguistic and 
cultural rights of all components of the Libyan society»47. This aspect is relevant 
because the three ethnic minorities – Amazigh, Tebu and Tuareg – demanded the 
recognition of their cultural and linguistic heritage and the end of their economic 
and social discrimination48. After years of repression due to Gaddafi’s Arabization 
policies, they contributed to the uprising and consequently asked for a recognition 
of their minority rights49. 
The Interim Constitutional Declaration also stated that the state should seek to 
establish a political democratic regime based upon a political multitude and a multi-
party system (art. 4). Relating to the form of state during the transitional period, art. 
16 and art. 30 established that the NTC was the authority in the state and was 
responsible for running the country until the election of the General National 
Congress. In fact, art. 30 represented the core of the roadmap towards the adoption 
of a new constitution and to the election of new legitimate national authorities50. 
Initially, this pathway was respected but it proved troublesome since its beginning. 
 
was guaranteed as long as it was in conformity with established customs. Differently, going back in 
time until the 1951 Constitution, art. 5 stated that Islam was the religion of the state but art. 11 
established the equality of all Libyans before the law without distinction of – among others – 
religion. Moreover, art. 21 established the absolute freedom of conscience, so that «the State shall 
respect all religions and faiths and shall ensure to foreigners residing in its territory freedom of 
conscience and the right freely to practice religion so long as it is not a breach of public order and is 
not contrary to morality». Libya’s Constitution of 2011, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2011.pdf, art. 1. 
47 Libya’s Constitution of 2011, cit., art. 1. 
48 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
cit., p. 84. 
49 See I. Kohl, Libya’s ‘Major Minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple Narratives of 
Citizenship, Language and Border Control, in Middle East Critique, No. 4, 2014; C. Pagano, 
Militanza amazigh e questione nazionale in Libia. La costruzione di un immaginario, in Zapruder. 
Storie in movimento, No. 49, 2019, 99-101. 
50 According to art. 30, the NTC had to adopt the statute for the election of the GNC, appoint the 
High National Elections Commission (HNEC) and call the elections for the GNC. At the first sitting 
of the GNC, the NTC was to be dissolved and, within a delay of thirty days after its first meeting, 
the GNC had to designate the prime minister and choose a body for the formulation of a draft 
constitution that had to present the draft to the GNC sixty days after its first meeting. Then, the draft 
had to be approved by the GNC and submitted to referendum within thirty days of its adoption. The 
quorum in the referendum was of two thirds of the voters. After having obtained it, the committee 
had to certify the text of the new constitution that was to be promulgated by the GNC. In addition, 
the GNC also had to adopt an act on general elections within thirty days from the promulgation and 
those elections had to take place within 120 days after that. The HNEC had to organise the general 
election under the supervision of the national judiciary and the control of the UN and other 
international and regional organisations. Once the election results were certified by the GNC, the 
legislative power had to be invited to convene within 30 days and its first meeting had to mark the 
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So, several amendments were necessary due to pressures coming from the Islamist 
opposition51 and from Cyrenaica52.  
Cyrenaica’s continued pressure and threats to boycott the GNC elections 
compelled the NTC to modify the Interim Constitutional Declaration, so that the 
Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) would have been directly elected by the 
population instead of being appointed by the GNC. As this alteration was 
announced only two days before the GNC elections, any further debate on this issue 
was hampered53.  
In this first phase of post-Gaddafi’s constitution-making, the process was mainly 
carried out at a national level both relating to the bodies involved and the 
stakeholders that intervened in the constitutional debate. At that time, the 
international actors that were particularly active in the military intervention did not 
seem to be equally involved also in constitution-making. It was only with the GNC 
election that a transnationalisation of the constitution-making began. 
 
4. From a national to a transnational constitution-making: towards the Libyan 
Political Agreement 
 
The GNC election of 7th July 2012 represented a fundamental step in the Libyan 
recent history of constitution-making, as it marked the beginning of a process of 
consultation with several international actors. The starting point was the 
deployment of an EU Election Assessment Team after an invitation by the High 
National Elections Commission (HNEC) to assess the conduct of the electoral 
process54. Then, two months later, the Vice President of the GNC, Saleh 
Mohammed Almkhozom, asked for the support of the Venice Commission to draft 
a constitution for a new democratic Libya55 and in November, a delegation held a 
meeting with the GNC. In addition, in order to support the reconciliation and the 
 
51 In January 2012, a draft law for the election of the GNC was presented, but it stipulated a 10 
percent quota for women, later abolished due to Islamist opposition. Islamists also pressured the 
NTC to abolish the ban on political parties based on religious or ethnic affiliation. N. Schnelzer, 
Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, cit., 57. 
52 In March 2012, a Conference of the People of Cyrenaica saw the participation of politicians, civil 
society activists, tribal associations and representatives of the military. The conference was led by 
Ahmed al-Zubair al-Senussi, a descendant of Idris. They addressed the NTC and asked to introduce 
a federal system in Libya with equality of all regions and to modernise the 1951 Constitution as a 
new Libyan constitutional charter. The NTC met the call for equality of the three historical regions 
and modified the composition of the Constitution Drafting Assembly by deciding that it had to be 
composed of 20 members of each region elected by the GNC, despite disparities in the population. 
However, they did not convince the NTC to re-adopt the 1951 Constitution. N. Schnelzer, Libya in 
the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, cit., 73-74. 
53 Idem, 57. 
54 The team was independent from the member states, the EU Delegation to Libya and the European 
Commission. Election Assessment Team Libya 2012, European Union Election Assessment Team 
to Thoroughly Assess National Election in Libya, 22 June 2012, 1. 
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post-conflict reconstruction, the EU organised a five-week Introduction Programme 
for 70 inexperienced newly elected members of the GNC between November and 
December 201256. Top-level European experts held training courses relating to the 
functions of a parliament and the constitutionalisation process57. 
Nevertheless, despite the elections were successful, fair and transparent and the 
positive sign of the invitation of the advisors of the Venice Commission and the 
EU, the enthusiasm for this moment of effective popular participation in Libyan 
politics was not long-lasting: insufficient institutional structures and internal 
dynamics, in a country that had experienced «Qadhafi’s long process of 
deinstitutionalisation»58, did not guarantee a smooth and peaceful transition. While 
the GNC proved to be very powerful in Libya’s institutional design, its power 
stemmed from the alliance with militia groups that impacted on its capacity to 
negotiate and develop consensus59. At the same time, the divisions that existed in 
the Libyan society were reflected also in the factions that soon emerged within the 
GNC and had repercussions on the whole constitution-making process. Namely, 
this was the case of the tensions with the ethnic minorities clearly analysed in the 
works of Sawani and Pack, Schnelzer, and Baldinetti60. 
For the purpose of this essay, it is worth mentioning that once the law for the 
direct election of the CDA was passed, it was strongly opposed by the ethnic 
communities Tebu, Amazigh and Tuareg. According to the electoral law, only six 
seats of the CDA – out of a total number of sixty – were reserved to these groups 
and divided among them61. The groups opposed such a low number, as it did not 
reflect their proportion in the population62, and demanded that the CDA decisions 
 
56 European Union, EU support to the Libyan National General Congress: Induction Programme to 
the Benefit of the 200 Newly Elected Members Started in Tripoli on 7 November, 9 November 2012, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133396.pdf.  
57 Ibidem. 
58 Jebnoun pointed out that due to this process Libya emerged from the civil war without «a robust 
civil society, but with powerful and violent non-state actors». N. Jebnoun, Beyond the Mayhem: 
Debating Key Dilemmas in Libya’s Statebuilding, in The Journal of North African Studies, No 5, 
836. 
59 N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, 
cit., 61-62; see also G. Joffé, Can Libya Survive as a Single State?, in L’Année du Maghreb, No. 21, 
2019.  
60 See Y. Sawani, J. Pack, Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty post-Qadhafi: the Islamist, 
Regionalist, and Amazigh Challenges, cit.; N. Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab Spring. The 
Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi, cit.; A. Baldinetti, Identità nazionale e 
riconoscimento delle minoranze in Libia: le richieste della società civile, cit.  
61 The Carter Center, The 2014 Constitutional Drafting Assembly Elections in Libya – Final Report, 
cit., 10. 
62 Notably, this was the position of the Amazigh. According to unofficial estimates, they are about 
10 percent of the Libyan population. K. Zurutuza, Libya’s Berbers fear Ethnic Conflict, in Al 
Jazeera, 6 January 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/1/6/libyas-berbers-fear-ethnic-
conflict; The Carter Center, The 2014 Constitutional Drafting Assembly Elections in Libya – Final 
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on some issues63 could be reached by consensus instead of by two-thirds majority64. 
As they called for an amendment of the Constitutional Declaration but the GNC did 
not pass it, the Amazigh Supreme Council and the Tebu National Assembly 
announced the boycott65. Eventually, the CDA elections of February 2014 were 
boycotted by the Amazigh66. Initially, also the Tebu boycotted the elections, but 
they took part in the re-runs in April. 
At that time, the political confrontation was not limited to the hall of the 
congress, but it was also played on the ground. The worsening of the security and 
political situation largely impacted on the constitution-building process, since it 
hampered the technical support of some external actors in the drafting process. For 
example, in January 2014, the president of the Venice Commission and two of its 
members had visited Tripoli after an invitation of the GNC67. They had discussed 
with the Libyan authorities about the constitutional process and the possible 
cooperation on the drafting of the new constitution68. The expertise of the Venice 
Commission could have had a strong impact on the constitution-building process 
and the future Libyan constitution, most probably characterised by a strong 
attention to the inclusion of norms relating to rule of law and human rights 
stemming from the Western liberal democratic TLO. However, the degradation of 
the security situation led to the temporary suspension of bilateral contacts, even if 
representatives of Libya participated in some multilateral activities of the Venice 
Commission69.   
Nevertheless, in this context the activities of local bodies continued. In February, 
a fifteen-member body with lawyers, academic and activists – the February 
Committee – was created to oversee the phasing out of the transitional legislature 
and develop an alternative legislative structure70. It proposed a 200-member House 
of Representatives (HoR) in Benghazi. An amendment of the 2011 Interim 
Constitutional Declaration was approved to set up this new structure meant to 
replace the GNC71. Elections were held in June 2014, but some GNC members, 
backed by Salafists, did not concede the victory, claiming that the HoR was an 
illegitimate body72. So, due to security concerns the HoR had to move to the eastern 
 
63 Name of the state, identity of the state, flag and anthem, and language rights. 
64 Idem, 29. 
65 Relating to the case of the Amazigh, see C. Pagano, Militanza amazigh e questione nazionale in 
Libia. La costruzione di un immaginario, cit., 100-101. 
66 C. Pagano, The Amazigh Issue in Post-Qadhdhāfi's Libya: Mobilizing History for Occupying a 
Political Vacuum, in Afriche e Orienti, No. 3, 2018, 69-70. 
67 Venice Commission, Annual Report of Activities 2014, 2015, 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-RA(2014)001-e, 67. 
68 Ibidem. 
69 Idem, 68.  
70 S. Ibrahim, Caught between Law and Politics: Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in 
Libya, in ConstitutionNet, 28 November 2014, https://constitutionnet.org/news/caught-between-
law-and-politics-judicial-review-constitutional-amendments-libya. 
71 Ibidem. 
72 C. Sbailò, Libia, la posta in gioco. Un compromesso costituzionale su un bicefalismo 
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city of Tobruk where it appointed General Khalifa Haftar to the role of commander 
of the Libyan National Army (LNA), the armed forces loyal to the HoR73. Haftar 
conducted several offensives against Islamist groups in the eastern part of Libya 
and expanded his influence in Cyrenaica, so that the LNA started exerting de facto 
control of the region.  
The deepening of the tensions among Libyan actors added an additional factor 
to the existing difficulties in adopting a new constitution. Thus, since then, a new 
phase of transnational partcipation in Libya’s constitution-building began, marked 
by a more direct, but not necessarily more efficient, involvement of transnational 
actors, especially the UN. Until a meeting in Ghadames in September 2014, the 
approach of the international community to the Libyan transition had been quite 
passive74. However, with the outbreak of the civil war, the UN became more 
actively involved in the transition. 
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), that had been 
deployed in 2011, started conducting intensive negotiations to favour peace talks 
between the HoR and the GNC. The result was the 2015 Libyan Political 
Agreement (LPA)75, also known as Skhirat Agreement. Signed on 17th December 
2015, it was preceded by negotiations between several Libyan political actors, 
including militia leaders, so that it stated to be the result of a dialogue between key 
players in Libyan politics76. Actually, it did not result from an effective Libyan 
participation in the drafting process. Despite previous talks, it was only UNSMIL 
which determined the content, so that it has been suggested that UN Special 
Representative (SRSG) Bernardino León Gross and his team «operated in a parallel 
reality to that of the Libyan reality on the ground»77. 
The LPA presented itself as a «unique opportunity to both address the immediate 
suffering of the Libyan people and build a democratic civil state through national 
consensus»78. It enshrined four main principles: the assurance of the democratic 
rights for the population; the need for a consensual government based on the 
separation, oversight and balance of powers; the need to empower state institutions 
and the respect for the judiciary and its independence. The executive power was in 
the hands of a nine-member Presidential Council, which could reach decisions by a 
consensus of six. It was tasked to form a Government of National Accord (GNA) 
 
73 W. Morana, The OSCE and the Libyan Crisis. Challenges and Opportunities for Comprehensive 
Security in the Mediterranean, in Security and Human Rights, No. 30, 2019, 26. 
74 F.A. van Lier, Constitution-Making as a Tool for State-Building? Insights From an Ethnographic 
Analysis of the Libyan Constitution-Making Process, cit., 13. 
75 See Libyan Political Agreement, 17 December 2015, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libyan-
political-agreement. 
76 UNSMIL, Libyan Political Agreement, 17 December 2015, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libya 
n-political-agreement. 
77 A. K. Maghur, What Went Wrong With Leon’s Libya Agreement?, Atlantic Council, 24 November 
2015, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-went-wrong-with-leon-s-libya-
agreement/. 
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and an advisory High State Council (HSC) formed by former GNC members79. The 
HoR remained the sole legislative authority.  
Under the preamble of LPA, the agreement was responding to the need of 
legitimate state institutions and stressed the adherence to the Interim Constitutional 
Declaration. Most importantly, among the governing principles that had to invoke 
the implementation and interpretation of the agreement, point 4 stressed the 
«Commitment to the importance of drafting a permanent constitution for Libya that 
achieves the ambitions and aspirations of the Libyan people towards building the 
state of institutions based on the rule of law and respect of human rights»80.  
In fact, the LPA gave much attention to constitution-building, by devoting to it 
a section from article 47 to article 52. Under these articles, all parties had to commit 
themselves to the impartiality and independence of the CDA, whose security and 
financial and logistical support had to be guaranteed by the GNA, so that it could 
perform its duties and finalize a permanent constitution (art. 48-49). The parties 
called on the CDA to expedite the development and announcement of a roadmap 
with a clear timetable for the remaining phases of the process (art. 50). Upon the 
completion of the final draft, the CDA had to take the opinions of the HoR and the 
HSC (art. 51). Later, the draft constitution could be sent for referendum (art. 51). 
Finally, article 52 stated that the work of the CDA shall continue until 24th March 
2016. If it was not able to conclude its activity by that date, a committee with five 
representatives of the HoR and five of the HSC with the participation of the 
Presidency Council had to be formed within two weeks to deliberate on this issue 
(art. 52). 
Eventually, the LPA did not manage to carry out a proper stabilization of the 
country and to overcome divisions. The HoR was split between opponents and 
supporters of the accord and rejected it as product of Western pressure rather than 
the outcome of an inclusive dialogue81. Even if its legitimacy was reduced by this 
rejection, the LPA was applied with the installation of the Presidential Council and 
the GNA. Most importantly for the purpose of this essay, even if the LPA included 
a section on the pathway towards the adoption of the new Libyan constitution, its 
attention to the process was extremely superficial and did not make the international 
community positively impact on the constitution-making. Basically, the power to 
promote or hamper this process remained in the hands of local institution, namely 
the CDA, the body tasked with the drafting process. In this sense, the LPA could 
be seen as a sincere effort to boost the drafting process, based on a truly inclusive 
Libyan dialogue. All the more so, even if the following years represented a 
particularly active phase towards the adoption of a draft, the impossibility to 
 
79 M. Eljarh, The Libyan Crisis: Internal Barriers to Conflict Resolution and the Role of Multilateral 
Cooperation, in A. Dessì, E. Greco (eds.), Search for Stability in Libya. OSCE’s Role between 
Internal Obstacles and External Challenges, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 
2018, 55. 
80 Libyan Political Agreement, cit., 4. 
81 W. Morana, The OSCE and the Libyan Crisis. Challenges and Opportunities for Comprehensive 
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conclude the activities of the CDA by the date set in the LPA – 24th March 2016 – 
stress the distance between the agreement and the reality of the civil war. 
 
5. Local tentative efforts: the Constitutional Drafting Assembly’s draft 
constitutions of 2015, 2016 and 2017 
 
While the UN was favouring the negotiations of the LPA, constitution-building 
efforts on behalf of the CDA did not stop. In December 2014, the CDA had 
published some proposals for different parts of the constitution82 that were later 
subject to debate and consultation with various stakeholders83 and in June 2015, the 
assembly formed a Working Committee (WC) to prepare a new draft constitution. 
It was a twelve-member body whose representation was equally divided between 
the three historical regions but did not involve Tebu and Tuareg84. Its working 
modalities were criticised as characterised by secrecy even with respect to the CDA 
members and as it did not take into account the chapters prepared by the Technical 
Committees of the CDA, therefore not considering the provisions on which there 
was already consensus85.  
The WC released a first draft in October 2015. It envisaged a stronger role for 
norms that may be considered to belong to the Islamic TLO: it proposed the 
establishment of a Council of Religious Scholars with fifteen experts chosen by the 
parliament to advise the authorities on religious aspects of public affairs, give 
advisory opinions based on shari‘a and conduct religious enquiries to address 
current problems86. The draft recognised the languages spoken by a part of the 
Libyans as national languages, while Arabic was the only official language87. It 
established a semi-presidential system with a very strong executive and, relating to 
the debate on federalism, it recognised the principle of extended decentralisation 
 
82 See J. Fedtke, Analysis of the Draft Constitution of Libya Thematic Committees of the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly Status: December 2014, International IDEA, 2015.  
83 The Draft Libyan Constitution: Procedural Deficiencies, Substantive Flaws, cit., 14. In fact, in 
2014, the CDA had held several public meetings to explain the drafting process to the population, 
which included meetings in townhalls and attempts to reach out to specific groups, such as women. 
Actually, those meetings were criticised by some civil society organisations because they were 
advertised with a limited advance, they were often attended only by tribal leaders and senior 
members of the society, they resembled more to a lecture than a debate and they were not held in 
some parts of Libya due to security reasons. Different groups submitted recommendations to the 
CDA, but the results were disappointing: few suggestions were reflected in the December 2014 
Proposals. Idem, 19-20. 
84 S. Ibrahim, Libya’s Long Awaited Constitution: Will it Finally See the Light of the Day?, in 
ConstitutionNet, 22 March 2016, https://constitutionnet.org/news/libyas-long-awaited-constitution-
will-it-finally-see-light-day. 
85 Ibidem. 
86 See The Draft Libyan Constitution: Procedural Deficiencies, Substantive Flaws, cit.; S. Ibrahim, 
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composed of municipalities and provinces. However, the central authorities could 
exercise great powers over these entities88. 
The October draft was criticised both by UNSMIL, due to provisions in contrast 
with international standards, and the CDA. So, the WC published a new draft a few 
months later. The February draft largely retained the provisions relating to shari‘a, 
but replaced the Council of Religious Scholars with a Council for Religious 
Research with fewer powers and an advisory nature89. In addition, the new draft 
included some relevant provisions for the rights of women, who had to be 
guaranteed equal rights as men and who could run for the presidency of the 
Republic and other offices90. Relating to the system of government, the draft 
constitution still envisaged an extended decentralization with a three-tier 
decentralized multi-order governance91.  
Even if the February draft tried to address the criticisms of the October draft92, 
the CDA met on 23rd February 2016 but did not reach the necessary quorum. In 
such a tense situation characterised by evident rifts within the CDA, the UN 
oversaw subsequent CDA negotiations in Salalah (Oman) in March 2016 that 
resulted in a slightly amended draft93. The new draft further worsened tensions 
within the CDA and was eventually annulled by the administrative appeals court in 
Beida. Thus, the 24th March 2016 deadline established by the LPA was not met94. 
However, an important result was obtained the following year. 
2017 was crucial in the constitution-making process. The CDA approved a new 
draft constitution on 29th July 201795 without any broad involvement of the 
population or public debate. However, two thirds of the members of the CDA 
approved it, giving for a while a new life to the transition process96.  
The draft established a republic with a semi-presidential system of government 
and a bicameral parliament – the Shura Council – composed of the HoR and the 
Senate (art. 67) and envisaged a system of local governance that had to be based on 





91 Democracy Reporting International, The New Vision of Local Governance in Libya by the Draft 
Constitution of 3 February 2016, Briefing Paper 65, March 2016, http://democracy-
reporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/dri_ly_bp_65_local_governance__3___1_.pdf, p. 1. 
92 Ibidem. 
93 F.A. van Lier, Constitution-Making as a Tool for State-Building? Insights From an Ethnographic 
Analysis of the Libyan Constitution-Making Process, cit., 15. 
94 Abed, News Roundup – Wed, Dec 07, 2016, in The Libya Observer, 7 December 2016, 
https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/news-roundup-wed-dec-07-2016. 
95 M. Toaldo, A Constitutional Panacea for Libya?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
22 August 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/72878.  
96 Z. Al-Ali, Libya’s Final Draft Constitution: A Contextual Analysis, International IDEA, 
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/201710/Analysis%20of%20Libya%27s%20final%20d
ra ft%20constitution%20-%20Zaid%20Al-Ali.pdf, 2. 
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levels of government – the central government in Tripoli, the governorates and the 
municipalities (art. 144) – but the decisions on how local government had to enjoy 
autonomous, transferrable and shared powers from and with the central authority 
were not specified but needed to be in accordance with law98. Finally, Chapter II 
enshrined the most common rights and freedoms protected by international human 
rights treaties and, interestingly, concerning the debate on ethnic minorities, article 
55 stated that the state should guarantee the protection of Libyan languages and the 
protection and promotion of local cultures, heritage, traditional knowledge, 
literature and art. 
 There was some debate relating to the legality of the CDA vote in favour of the 
final version of the draft, as it had been claimed that the CDA did not properly 
follow its own rules when it voted99. However, the session was not repeated, and it 
was decided that the draft had been approved, causing the reaction of two Tebu 
representatives who announced their rejection of the document because it did not 
grant sufficient rights to the ethnic minorities. This reaction was relevant, as the 
draft constitution both needed the two-thirds majority of the CDA and the approval 
by one each of the two Tebu and two Tuareg members. Despite this opposition, the 
CDA asked the HNEC to prepare for a referendum, that theoretically was supposed 
to happen within 30 days after the CDA formally proposing a constitution100.  
However, the first obstacles started emerging when the HNEC noted that it 
would need the HoR to pass a law in order to go ahead with the poll101. Moreover, 
the Beida court ruled the suspension of the bill, preventing the HoR to vote on the 
constitution, and only in February 2018 the Supreme Court of Tripoli overturned 
the judgement, paving the way for the referendum102. Finally, in November 2018, 
the HoR passed the Constitution Referendum Law, amended the 2011 
Constitutional Declaration and divided Libya into three voting regions: 
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. Each region had to vote in favour of the draft 
constitution with a simple majority, but a two-thirds majority was necessary at the 
national level. The HoR also issued Law No. 6, which tasked the HNEC with 
conducting a referendum on the 2017 draft103. However, the referendum has not 
taken place yet. 
 
6. From 2017 to present: a new phase of transnational constitution-making   
 
98 Z. Al-Ali, Libya’s Final Draft Constitution: A Contextual Analysis, cit., 12. 
99 CDA Calls on Election Commission to Prepare Referendum on Draft Constitution as Tebu 





102 K. Mahmoud, Libya: MPs Refuse to Recognize the Constitution Drafting Assembly, in Asharq 
al-Awsat, 21 February 2018, https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1182411/libya-mps-refuse-
recognize-constitution-drafting-assembly.  
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Even if at the beginning of 2017, the UN-led political process seemed to be 
overcome by a parallel process led by the UAE with the collaboration of Russia and 
Egypt104, by June the UN took again the lead of the peace negotiations with the new 
SRSG, Ghassan Salamé105. In September 2017, he presented an Action Plan, 
stressing the attention towards the participation of Libyan citizens in its 
development106. It was to be composed of four different phases: first, the 
amendment of the LPA; second, the opening of a National Conference under the 
auspices of the UN Secretary General to include those players which had been 
reluctant to join the political process, bringing together the members of the HoR, of 
the HSC and many others not represented in those bodies; third, a parallel work of 
the HoR and the CDA, so that the HoR prioritized the legislation for presidential 
and parliamentary elections and the constitutional referendum, and the CDA 
reviewed the draft constitution; fourth, the end of this process within one year with 
the referendum to adopt the new constitution and then the election of a president 
and a parliament107. 
As the Action Plan was implemented only partially, in February 2018, Salamé 
asked the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) to run consultations among the 
Libyans in order to clarify the strategy and the objectives of the National 
Conference and to give the opportunity to all Libyans to contribute to its 
conclusions108. This represented another fundamental step in the 
transnationalisation of the constitution-making process, as a Swiss-based private 
diplomacy organization was involved in the consultation promoted by the UN. 
Differently from the LPA and the Action Plan, which were simply providing for a 
general roadmap for the Libyan institutions, the involvement of the HD represented 
an effort to find some elements of consensus in Libya’s fragmented political 
landscape. 
The consultation phase ran from April to July 2018. The final report of the HD109 
stated that the consultative process was composed of 77 separate meetings, more 
than 7,000 Libyans of different social extraction participated and a quarter of them 
were women. Citizens could also participate via an online platform, so that the 
overall total participation was of 1.8 million Libyans. In addition, also local media 
outlets played a role in covering the meetings and produced reports summarising 
 
104 See A. Mattiello (a cura di), Verso una nuova Roadmap della Libia?, Senato della Repubblica, 
Servizio Affari Internazionali, 12 November 2018, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFS 
erver/BGT/01081241.pdf. 
105 Ibidem. 
106 He stated: «This Action Plan for Libya was not designed by me, but by the Libyan people who I 
crossed in towns, cities and countries to speak to. It is, in essence, a synthesis of their hopes and 
goals». UNSMIL, Remarks of SRSG Salamé at the High-Level Event on Libya, 20 September, 2017, 
https://unsmil.unmissions.org/remarks-srsg-salam%C3%A9-high-level-event-libya. 
107 Ibidem.  
108 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Libyan National Conference Process. Final Report, 
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the recommendations. The role of the HD was relevant as it worked with the 
organisers, was present at each event and made all efforts to ensure that the process 
was inclusive.  
Relating to the constitution-making process, the results of the consultation 
showed that there was consensus on the need to end the transitional phase, even if 
few participants were optimistic that a new constitution or elections could solve 
deep-seated problems. In addition, the report included some results that clearly 
reflected the Libyans’ will that the next constitution would reflect traditional 
practices, values and public conscience, irrespective of foreign interference. It was 
at this point that the necessity to include norms that may not belong to the Western 
TLO or that may even be deemed in contrast with it emerged as a precondition not 
to question the charter’s legitimacy. In addition, further stressing the necessity to 
have a Libyan-led process, the interviewees largely answered that a referendum had 
to be held on the draft constitution. 
This promising consultation notwithstanding, foreign actors continued to be 
central in promoting constitution-making but they remained quite detached from 
the Libyan population. In the last years, European leaders organised several 
conferences aimed at Libya’s stabilization that included sections devoted to 
constitution-making. The first one was held in Paris on 28th May 2018, where the 
French president Macron hosted the leaders of Libya’s main factions and the 
representatives from 20 states and international organisations to establish a 
roadmap to end political instability110. The parties agreed on the urgency to adopt a 
constitution as the first point of the principles to stabilize Libya and on the necessity 
to formulate an electoral framework by 16th September, to hold parliamentary and 
presidential elections on 10th December and to promote unity among the several 
Libyan financial and security bodies111. However, the distance between the Paris 
conclusions and the reality on the ground was broad. Holding free and fair elections 
was difficult due to the lack of a unified security apparatus and the existence of 
several local militias112, so that both the general elections and the constitutional 
referendum were postponed until at least 2019 due to continued instability113. 
In order to overcome the stalemate, Salamé proposed a revised Action Plan. 
Under this new plan, the National Conference was tasked to define its own vision 
on Libya’s transition and to settle – once again – a roadmap114. On 9th November 
2018, Salamé announced that the «Libyan-led and Libyan-owned» National 
 
110 See S. Haddad, Dialogues, ambiguïtés et impasses libyennes, in L’Année du Maghreb, No, 19, 
2018; F. Saini Fasanotti, A. Varvelli, Libia: l’anno di Haftar?, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica 
Internazionale, 27 December 2018, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/libia-lanno-di-haftar-
21870. 
111 Ibidem.  
112 A. Al-Shadeedi, Are the Next Libyan Elections Doomed to Fail?, Clingendael, 14 June 2018, 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/are-next-libyan-elections-doomed-fail.  
113 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Libya Country Report 2020, cit.  
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Conference had to start its activities in the first weeks of 2019115, providing a 
platform for speech for the Libyan people, including tribes and militias116.  
This objective was also shared by the participants of the Palermo Conference 
(12th-13th November 2018) in an attempt of the Italian government to counter the 
Paris summit117. The conference joined together both Libyan delegations and 
representatives of several countries and international organizations. The 
participants welcomed Salamé’s call for a Libyan-led inclusive National 
Conference as an opportunity to forego the use of force to settle their disputes, to 
adopt principles and a timeline for the unification of their institutions and commit 
to the democratic renewal of their elected bodies118. In addition, they underlined the 
importance of concluding the subsequent constitutional framework and electoral 
process by spring 2019, but also this project failed. 
In September 2019, an additional process of consultation was initiated by Salamé 
and the German government. It resulted in the Berlin International Conference on 
Libya on 19th January 2020. As in Paris and Palermo, a number of countries and 
international organisations convened in Berlin. The main objective was «to forge a 
consensus» on the Libyan crisis and to pave the way for «an international umbrella 
to protect intra-Libyan discussions over the future of the country»119. The 
conclusions recognised the central role of international organisations in Libya’s 
stabilisation120. The parties supported the LPA as a viable framework for the 
political solution and called for the establishment of a functioning Presidency 
Council and a single, unified, inclusive and effective government approved by the 
HoR. They urged Libyan parties to resume an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-
owned political process under the auspices of UNSMIL with the participation of 
women and youth, and called on international actors to act against Libyan spoilers 
of the political process121. The Berlin Conference also created an International 
 
115 UNSMIL, Remarks of SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United Nations Security Council on the 
Situation in Libya, 9 November 2018, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/remarks-srsg-ghassan-
salam%C3%A9-united-nations-security-council-situation-libya.  
116 A. Mattiello (a cura di), Verso una nuova Roadmap della Libia?, cit., 4. 
117 K. Mezran, E. A. Neale, Libya, the US, and the Palermo Conference, Atlantic Council, 9 
November 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/libya-the-us-and-the-
palermo-conference/. 
118 Conclusions, Palermo Conference for and with Libya, 12/13 November 2018,  
http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/conference_for_libia_conclusions_0.pdf, 1-2. 
119UNSMIL, Berlin International Conference on Libya, 19 January 2020, 
https://unsmil.unmissions.org/berlin-international-conference-libya-19-january-2020. 
120 In particular, it talked about «the central role of the UN to facilitate intra-Libyan political and 
reconciliation process […] as well as the important roles of the African Union and its High Level 
Committee of the Heads of State and Government on Libya, the League of Arab States, the European 
Union and the neighboring countries in Libya’s stabilization» and «all these International 
Organisations will closely work together». Bundesregierung, The Berlin Conference on Libya. 
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Follow-Up Committee including all countries and international organisations that 
participated in the conference to maintain coordination among the actors122.  
Basing on UNSC Resolution 2510 (2020) that endorsed the conclusions of the 
Berlin Conference, UNSMIL facilitated the first round of the Libyan Political 
Dialogue Forum from 7th to 15th November 2020 in Tunisi123. The LPDF reunited 
75 participants, both women and men, representing the full social and political 
spectrum of Libya’s society124. The talks were facilitated by the Acting SRSG for 
Libya and head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, with the support of UNSMIL and 
a team of the HD. At the end, the participants agreed on a roadmap to the elections, 
to be held on 24th December 2021, the 70th anniversary of Libya’s independence. 
The elections are currently at the heart of the debate as they would mark a 
fundamental step towards the stabilization of the country and the adoption of a 
permanent constitution. On 19th and 20th January 2021, the Constitutional 
Committee formed by the HoR and the HSC held a meeting in Hurghada (Egypt) 
and agreed to hold a constitutional referendum on the proposal drafted by the CDA 
before the general elections of 24th December125. Further discussions, brokered by 
UNSMIL, were held in February to reach an agreement on the date of the 
referendum126 but no official date is currently available. 
In the meanwhile, the UN-led LPDF appointed an interim government with 
Mohammed al-Menfi as head of the Presidency Council and Abdulhamid Dbeibeh 
as prime minister. The aim of this administration is to end the division of Libya in 
the path towards the national elections127. In this occasion, the CDA asked 
UNSMIL not to put the constitutional draft up for discussion: half of the members 
argued that neither UNSMIL nor any other current political body had the right to 
reject or approve the constitution, a power that belongs exclusively to Libyans128.  
Today, on 9th March 2021, an official date for the constitutional referendum has 





122 Ibidem.  
123 UNSMIL, Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libyan-political-
dialogue-forum.  
124 Ibidem. 
125 UNSMIL, UNSMIL Welcomes the Meeting of the Constitutional Committee in Hurghada, 20 
January 2021, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-welcomes-meeting-constitutional-committee-
hurghada. 
126 S. Zaptia, HoR-HSC Joint Constitutional Committee Hold Third Hurghada Meeting, in Libya 
Herald, 9 February 2021, https://www.libyaherald.com/2021/02/09/hor-hsc-joint-constitutional-
committee-hold-third-hurghada-meeting/. 
127 UN-led Libya Forum Selects New Interim Government, in Al Jazeera, February 2021, https://w 
ww.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/5/libyas-factions-head-into-runoff-on-interim-government.  
128 J. Jawhar, Libya’s CDA Warns against Discussing Draft Constitution in Geneva, in Asharq Al-
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Libya’s constitution-making is still in progress. Its future is uncertain, as a date 
for the constitutional referendum has not been set yet. There are some hopes that it 
will take place before the general elections in December 2021 and so Libya will 
finally adopt a new permanent constitution after years of instability. If the process 
proves successful, the 2017 Draft will become Libya’s permanent constitution. 
Nevertheless, the success of the process is not indisputable. Libya’s last decade has 
been marked by the development of several roadmaps that were not put into practice 
and up to now, the 2011 Interim Constitutional Declaration is still in force. 
However, Libya’s constitution-making has evolved over the last decade. The 
Interim Constitutional Declaration was the result of an exclusively intra-Libyan 
effort to establish a provisional framework in the transitional phase. Later, the 
drafting process proved to be extremely challenging and the involvement of 
transnational actors became inevitable, even if it was stronger in some periods than 
in some other moments.  
Some aspects of the ongoing transnational constitution-making are worth 
mentioning. First, the fact that constitution-making has not been limited to Libyan 
actors is not new: the drafting of 1951 Constitution was marked by the UN. Today 
the UN is still the leading external actor in the process, but other international 
organisations – the EU, the AU and the AL – have played an ancillary role in 
participating in UN-led conferences and supporting their conclusions. The EU, 
strongly interested in a stabilisation of the southern Mediterranean basin, has also 
been involved but it seems that its action has been additional to the one of the UN. 
Second, organisations specifically devoted to democracy and constitutional 
assistance have been working behind the scenes but have contributed to the process. 
The Venice Commission was initially involved, but after 2014 its visits were 
hampered by degrading security conditions. However, it has continued playing an 
advisory role when its contribution has been requested. The participation of a 
private diplomacy organisation, the HD, in the 2018 consultative process should 
also be acknowledge.  
However, also Libyan bodies have been central in both promoting and 
hampering the process. Definitely, if the 2017 Draft will be adopted, it will be the 
result of an intra-Libyan acceptance of the externally promoted constitution-making 
process. Libya’s centrality is clear also in the norms of the 2017 Draft Constitution. 
While elements of the Western liberal TLO are encapsulated in the charter, 
especially concerning rights and freedoms, some typically Islamic elements persist. 
For example, Islam is the religion of the State, shari‘a the source of legislation and 
a Shari‘a Research Council shall be established. Hence, in Libya two TLOs may 
interfere. This might seem paradoxical because of the apparent inconsistency of 
constitutionalism and certain aspects of shari‘a. However, they could be compatible 
depending on the interpretation of Islamic law129. In fact, elements of an Islamic 
 
129 A.A. An-Na’im, The Legitimacy of Constitution-Making Processes in the Arab World, in R. 
Grote, T.J. Röder (eds.), Constitutionalism, Human Rights, and Islam after the Arab Spring, Oxford 
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TLO are necessary as the constitution needs what An-Na’im defined as «Islamic 
legitimacy», that is 
 
taking local Islamic concerns and discourse into consideration in assessing the 
substantive and procedural legitimacy of the constitution-making process in any 
country. This does not mean that there is some specific “Islamic” criterion of legitimacy 
to be applied, as there are too many competing interpretations of Islam for there to be 
agreement on that. Rather, the point here is that the criterion for assessing legitimacy 
should be internal to each society, and should include Islam or other religions adhered 
to by significant segments of the population130. 
 
To conclude, Libya’s draft constitution results in a combination of norms 
originating in these TLOs, reinforcing, on the one hand, the legitimacy before 
international organisations and Western states involved in Libya’s constitution-
making, and, on the other hand, the “Islamic legitimacy” before the majority of the 
population. Only the referendum, the adoption of a permanent constitution and its 
implementation will allow to assess whether the combination of national and 
transnational actors and of the Western and the Islamic TLOs proved successful. 
 
130 Idem, 35. 
